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Abstract	
In	 development	 policy	 circles,	 corruption	 has	 become	 a	 pressing	 global	 issue.	 Yet	 the	
contemporary	relationship	between	corruption	and	development	is	complex	and	contested.	
For	many,	corruption	robs	people	of	economic	resources	and	social	wealth,	and	denudes	
the	state	of	important	capacities.	That	is,	corruption	prevents	or	blocks	development.	For	
others,	corruption	often	occurs	in	the	process	of	development	as	the	form	in	which	a	class	
of	developers	accumulates	wealth.	That	is,	corruption	is	a	phase	of	development.	This	article	
explores	the	contested	relationship	through	two	case	studies:	in	Sub‐Saharan	Africa	and	in	
the	former	Soviet	Union.	The	article	also	links	contemporary	debates	about	corruption	and	
development	with	earlier	thinking	about	capitalist	progress	and	development.		
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Introduction	
Corruption,	a	word	that	could	not	be	even	used	in	official	World	Bank	reports	until	the	late‐1980s,	
and	which	did	not	become	an	explicit	Bank	policy	target	until	the	late‐1990s,	is	now	seemingly	
occurring	on	an	unprecedented	scale	(Jain	2011).	According	to	Frank	Vogl	(2016),	founder	of	the	
corruption	monitor	Transparency	International,	corruption	is	now	no	longer	just	a	minor	issue	
of	bribery	and	petty	theft,	it	‘…	thrives	and	is	universal’.		
	
The	 negative	 effects	 of	 corruption	 are	 now	 thought	 to	 be	manifold,	 from	 growing	 control	 of	
political	 institutions	 by	 small	 groups	 of	 economically	 powerful	 people,	 to	 fiscal	 and	
environmental	crises	and	widening	inequality.	Corruption	is	said	to	be	holding	millions	of	people	
in	poverty	and	reducing	the	possible	rate	of	economic	growth	as	well	as	the	distribution	of	its	
benefits.	 Furthermore,	 corruption	 is	 also	 now	 widely	 seen	 to	 be	 emasculating	 the	 state	 and	
private	institutions	that	have	traditionally	been	the	vehicles	for	addressing	poverty	and	bringing	
development.	 In	this	context,	 it	 is	surely	worth	asking	what	 is	 the	connection,	 if	any,	between	
corruption	and	development.		
	
In	interrogating	the	contemporary	links	between	corruption	and	development,	this	article	ties	
those	connections	into	the	longer	historical	trajectory	of	capitalist	development	and	corruption.	
Two	decades	ago,	Cowen	and	Shenton	(1996,	1997)	observed	that	the	contemporary	literature	
on	development	was	divided	over	whether	corruption	is	the	negation	of	development	and	the	
marker	of	 the	process	of	 under‐development,	 or	whether	 it	 is	 a	 condition	which	will	 only	 be	
eliminated	after	development	has	happened:	that	is,	corruption	is	a	phase	of	actual	development.		
	
The	view	that	 corruption	 is	dysfunctional	 for	development—where	corruption	 is	 tied	 to	 state	
personnel	changing	policy	when	induced	to	do	so	by	bribes	and	other	inducements,	or	advancing	
their	own	direct	commercial	interests—conceptualises	corruption	as	the	negation	of	the	policy	
of	development.	Here	corruption	distorts	and	refracts	the	authenticity	of	development,	with	the	
direct	policy	implication	that	development	can	and	must	be	redeemed	from	corruption.	
	
The	counter	claim	is	that	corruption	is	essentially	the	primary	accumulation	for	development	to	
occur.	 In	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 class	 of	 ‘developers’,	 it	 is	 first	 necessary	 for	 them	 to	 be	 able	 to	
command	enough	resources	to	set	a	process	of	development	in	motion.	Later,	and	again	in	their	
own	self‐interest,	developers	will	look	to	protect	their	interests	by	instituting	the	rule	of	law,	and	
democratic	checks	on	what	is	then	recast	as	arbitrary	(and	corrupt)	authority.	In	other	words,	
developing	capitalist	nations	must	generally	go	through	a	phase	of	corruption.	
	
Cowen	and	Shenton’s	dichotomy	of	the	controversy	over	corruption	helps	to	link	it	to	historical	
debates	 about	 development	 and	 under‐development.	 As	 they	note,	 in	many	ways	 the	 current	
controversies	mirror	much	of	the	historical	evolution	of	the	meaning	of	development	itself	(with	
Cardinal	Newman,	John	Stuart	Mill	and	August	Comte	as	its	key	figures).	Indeed,	it	is	possible	to	
see	several	phases	in	the	history	of	capitalism	characterised	by	quite	intense	concern	with	the	
negative	 effects	 of	 capitalist	 development	 (including	 poverty	 and	 inequality,	 as	 well	 as	
concentrated	 political	 and	 economic	 power).	 Each	 age	 of	 what	 is	 now	 being	 termed	 ‘grand	
corruption’	appears	to	have	some	of	 its	own	characteristics,	with,	for	instance,	the	 ‘gilded	age’	
populated	by	‘robber	barons’	a	central	feature	of	late	nineteenth	century	USA.	While	there	are	
many	parallels	with	earlier	periods,	what	seems	to	make	the	decades	from	the	late	1970s	distinct	
is	the	apparent	universal	spread	and	scale	of	corruption.	Concern	for	its	corrosive	and	destructive	
effects	 (what	 then	 World	 Bank	 President	 James	 Wolfensohn	 (1996)	 called	 the	 ‘cancer	 of	
corruption’)	is	characterised	as	an	especially	prominent	feature	of	globalisation.		
	
Paradoxically,	the	contemporary	rising	concern	with	corruption	is	a	period	when	the	post‐World	
War	 II	 international	 enthusiasm	 for	 development	 continues	 unabated.	 Post‐war	
developmentalism	 is	 often	 supposed	 to	 have	 commenced	with	 US	 President	 Harry	 Truman’s	
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inauguration	speech	of	20	 January	1949	 linking	 ‘improvement	and	growth	of	underdeveloped	
areas’,	with	the	death	of	the	‘old	imperialism’	(cited	in	Cowen	and	Shenton	1996:	7).	Despite	so	
much	of	the	rest	of	early	post‐war	policy	being	rejected	or	left	behind,	the	idea	of	development	
continues	to	dominate	discussions	of	global	change.	Even	though	the	concept	of	development	has	
changed,	 international	 and	 national	 planning	 continues	 to	 bear	 such	 slogans	 as	 ‘accelerated	
development’,	‘spontaneous	development’,	‘sustainable	development’,	and	‘governance	reforms	
to	bring	development’.		
	
To	 address	 the	 article’s	 opening	 question	 about	 the	 connections	 between	 corruption	 and	
development,	the	paper	briefly	outlines	development’s	pre‐1949	history	to	show	that	corruption	
was	integral	to	the	initial	formulation	of	the	concept	of	development.	In	particular,	it	will	show	
how	the	characterisation	of	corruption	became	associated	with	what	the	project	of	development	
was	to	counter	and	transcend:	the	condition	of	underdevelopment.		
	
The	continuity	in	the	relationship	between	development	and	corruption	is	then	illustrated	with	
two	accounts	of	the	post‐1970s	drive	to	bring	development,	in	this	case	Sub‐Saharan	Africa	and	
Kenya,	and	post‐1989	Soviet	Union	and	Russia.	In	the	former,	‘accelerated	development’	opened	
space	 for	corruption	on	a	scale	and	 in	forms	which	were	unprecedented;	 in	 the	 latter,	nation‐
states	 re‐entering	 capitalism	 were	 subjected	 to	 the	 notion	 that	 (market)	 development	 was	
spontaneous	and	simply	needed	the	state	to	wither	away.	As	Janos	Kornai	argued,	this	sense	of	
spontaneity	meant	that	it	was	thought	that	‘[c]apitalism	does	not	need	to	be	imposed	on	society	
…	If	nothing	else	had	happened	but	[by]	removal	of	the	barriers,	capitalism	would	still	start	to	
develop	…’	(Kornai	2000:	32).	 Instead,	via	a	program	of	rapid	marketisation	and	privatisation	
(the	removal	of	the	'barriers'	to	capitalism	that	came	to	be	known	as	‘shock	therapy’),	control	of	
the	state	was	effectively	handed	to	a	small	group	of	powerful	state	apparatchiks	and	aspirant	
capitalists.	They	found	an	easy	way	of	accumulating	from	the	privatisation	and	plundering	of	state	
assets.	In	a	very	short	space	of	time,	one	form	of	concentrated	ownership	(the	socialist	state)	was	
replaced	by	another	form	(oligarchical	capitalism).		
	
The	problems	of	corruption	(or	non‐	or	distorted	development)	have	recently	been	reposed	in	
terms	of	‘governance’	and	‘sustainable	development’.	Governance	reforms	have	been	introduced	
with	the	intention	of	reining	in	what	had	occurred	spontaneously	when	the	fetters	were	removed	
from	private	 (or	 privatised)	 accumulation.	 Thus,	 from	being	 concerned	with	 changes	 to	 state	
actions,	and	in	the	wake	of	the	failed	attempts	with	initial	moves	to	foster	development,	we	are	
seeing	development	further	reformed	to	what	is	intended	under	the	rubric	of	governance.	Here	
we	can	see	the	politics	of	governance	coming	increasingly	to	the	fore,	including	greater	emphasis	
on	state	capacities,	popular	participation	and	accountability	through	‘free	and	fair’	elections,	and	
‘transparency’	in	government	decision‐making	processes.	
	
The	corruption	of	development	in	the	nineteenth	century	
While	 the	 case	 studies	 presented	 below	 detail	 the	 connection	 between	 development	 and	
corruption	in	our	epoch,	it	is	important	first	of	all	to	show	the	intimate	and	necessary	connection	
between	 the	 two	 in	 some	 historical	 perspective.	 In	 brief,	 the	 simple	 argument	 is	 that,	 in	 the	
nineteenth	century,	corruption	was	understood	to	be	embedded	within,	and	inseparable	from,	
development.	Corruption	is	the	process	of	under‐development,	rather	than	the	condition	of	being	
underdeveloped,	 or	 underdevelopment	 as	 in	 the	 sense	 implied	 in	 Truman’s	 inauguration	
statement,	cited	above.	Before	moving	to	the	case	studies,	it	may	be	worth	a	brief	diversion	into	
the	etymology	of	the	terms	corruption	and	development.	
	
While	 it	 is	 now	 fashionable	 to	 elide	 development	 and	 economic	 growth	 with	 such	 claims	 as	
‘development	is	more	than	economic	growth’,	the	modern	idea	of	development	commenced	as	a	
proposed	 antidote	 to	 some	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 rapid	 commercial	 expansion	 (that	 is,	 economic	
growth).	 In	 the	 early	 nineteenth	 century,	 progress	 epitomised	 by	 rapid	 industrialisation	 in	
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Europe	was	also	directly	associated	with	growth’s	negative	effects,	particularly	unemployment,	
industrial	injury	and	social	disorder.	Instead	of	advocating	for	what	are	today’s	‘market	clearing	
solutions’,	positivists	argued	that	the	deleterious	effects	of	growth	were	predictable	and	capable	
of	 solution.	 Instead	 of	 simply	 accepting	 the	 positive	 and	 negative	 effects	 of	 capitalism’s	
spontaneous	 process	 of	 accumulation,	 intentional	 development	 could	 be	 engaged	 to	 make	
productive	that	which	had	become	unproductive,	damaged	or	under‐utilised,	including	labour.	
Development	could,	in	this	way,	supplant	progress,	making	change	a	unity	of	dichotomies;	that	is,	
a	combination	of	spontaneous	and	intentional	processes.	Most	importantly,	the	two	processes	of	
spontaneous	and	intentional	development	could	operate	in	tandem,	with	no	necessary	temporal	
lag.	Because	of	the	inevitability	of	spontaneous	development’s	negative	effects,	it	would	even	be	
possible	to	anticipate	their	occurrence	by	intentional	development	planning.	
	
Intentional	development	did	not	aim	to	override	the	external	authority	of	capital.	As	Chalmers	
Johnson	(1999),	one	of	the	academics	central	to	the	contemporary	‘developmental	state	debate’,	
has	stressed,	Japan	and	other	similar	countries	were/are	forms	of	the	capitalist	and	not	socialist	
states.	Industrialisation,	especially	manufacturing	expansion,	occurred	through	intentional	state	
practices,	which	supervised	and	supported	private	firms	in	production	and	marketing,	including	
through	providing	subsidised	finance	and	a	supply	of	labour	(Amsden	1989).	
	
Spontaneous	development,	by	contrast,	represents	the	imperative	to	accumulate	and	capitalists	
acting	compulsively:	 ‘Accumulate,	 accumulate!	This	 is	Moses	and	 the	Prophets’	 in	Karl	Marx’s	
well‐known	punning	aphorism.	By	contrast,	trusteeship	and	trustees	are	required	to	make	forms	
of	 intentional	 development	 happen,	 and	 especially	 to	 counter	 the	 negative	 consequences	 of	
spontaneous	development.	Trusteeship	 is	not,	however,	 inevitable,	and	at	various	moments	 is	
unable	to	stay	the	deleterious	effects	produced	by	the	drive	to	accumulate	spontaneously.	Since	
the	1960s	at	least,	and	particularly	since	the	1980s,	the	contempt	in	which	trusteeship	came	to	
be	 held	 created	 space	 for	 a	 prolonged	 attack	 on	 state	 practices.	 The	 thrust	 of	 what	 is	 often	
inaccurately	labelled	neo‐liberalism	(Stedman	Jones	2014)	attached	itself	to	this	contempt	in	the	
guise	of	‘freeing	up	markets’,	‘letting	the	market	rule’	and	other	similar	slogans.	State	planning	to	
restrain	 deleterious	 forms	 of	 private	 accumulation,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 reduce	 unemployment	 and	
under‐employment,	came	under	sustained	global	attack.		
	
The	 effect	 became	what	 nineteenth	 century	 English	 Catholic	 clergyman	 John	Henry	Newman	
termed	 ‘under‐development’	(Cowen	and	Shenton	1996:	9‐10;	Newman	1845).	This	was	not	a	
state	or	condition	of	underdevelopment—as	in	underdeveloped	areas	or	nations—but	one	where	
corruption	attacked	the	previous	basis	of	state	power	through	which	intentional	development	
was	joined	to	spontaneous	development.	As	Cowen	and	Shenton	note,	‘Corruption	…	came	to	refer	
to	cases	where	state	order	had	become	unstable	and	national	power	had	declined	because	the	
balance	 of	 political	 and	 economic	 power	 had	 been	 shifted,	 either	 against	 the	 few	 of	 the	
aristocracy,	or	the	many,	of	the	people’	(1996:	93).	And	as	Cowen	and	Shenton	(1996:	99)	go	on	
to	 conclude:	 ‘[w]ith	 the	development	of	 capitalism	 in	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 the	 connotations	
which	had	hitherto	been	conveyed	by	“corruption”	were	now	conveyed	by	“underdevelopment”’;	
that	is,	under‐development	as	a	process	akin	to	corruption	as	particular	actions.	
	
The	remainder	of	the	essay	shows,	through	the	cases	of	Sub‐Saharan	Africa	and	Kenya	on	the	one	
hand	and	post‐Soviet	Union	Russia	on	 the	other,	how	attacks	on	previously	 constructed	 state	
power	led	to	disorder	and	plundering	of	the	state.	In	response	to	the	re‐assertion	of	the	external	
authority	of	capital,	which	in	many	places	became	grand	corruption,	we	are	seeing	demands	for	
state	reform	in	the	name	of	governance	to	bring	further	development.		
	
Accelerated	development	
During	the	1970s,	in	a	period	of	slowing	economic	growth,	international	supervisory	institutions	
including	the	International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF)	began	to	warn	industrial	countries	about	the	
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dangers	of	further	deterioration	in	domestic	economic	and	financial	conditions,	including	rising	
levels	of	public	and	private	debt.	The	IMF	increasingly	demanded	cuts	to	public	expenditure	as	a	
condition	of	 its	lending.	Its	concern	with	fiscal	austerity	continued	into	the	next	decade,	when	
Australia	too	came	in	for	attention.	However,	the	focus	upon	‘western’	democratic	countries	was	
distinct	from	the	attention	being	paid	at	around	the	same	time	on	how	to	‘accelerate’	development	
in	‘developing’	countries,	particularly	in	Latin	America	and	Africa.	For	this	drive,	it	was	the	World	
Bank’s	development	agency,	the	International	Bank	for	Reconstruction	and	Development	(IBRD)	
rather	than	the	IMF,	which	led	the	new	prescriptive	charge.		
	
There	appeared	to	be	many	similarities	in	the	prescriptions	offered	by	both	institutions,	which	
has	 created	 some	 subsequent	 confusion	 for	 many	 commentators	 (vis‐à‐vis	 ‘the	 Washington	
Consensus’).	 However,	 the	 outcomes,	 including	 the	 concern	 with	 governance	 and	 grand	
corruption,	show	the	need	to	distinguish	between	what	was	being	proposed	for	countries	‘already	
developed’	and	those	which	were	considered,	in	Truman’s	terms,	‘underdeveloped’,	and	needing	
development.	For	the	former,	reducing	debt,	cutting	public	expenditures,	removing	restrictions	
on	currency	fluctuations	and	privatising	state	agencies	were	central	demands	for	IMF	loans	or	
credits.	These	actions,	it	was	suggested,	would	reduce	‘crowding	out’	effects	and	open	domestic	
markets	 to	 international	 competition.	 Given	 that	 the	 industrial	 countries	 already	 contained	
primarily	 urban	 populations,	with	most	workers	 in	waged	 employment,	 barriers	 to	 reducing	
wages	and	labour	costs	were	a	central	focus	of	policy	prescriptions.	Levels	of	unionisation	and	
the	effectiveness	of	trade	unions	in	determining	wages	and	working	conditions,	as	well	as	the	
organisational	and	political	power	of	labour	more	generally,	were	targeted	for	attack.	Protection	
of	manufacturing	 industries	was	 also	 to	 be	 reduced—and	 eventually	 eliminated—in	 order	 to	
produce	an	international	‘level	playing	field’.	
	
For	the	developing	countries,	the	prescriptions	had	some	striking	similarities:	reducing	public	
debt,	 cutting	 government	 expenditure,	 and	 so	 on,	 appeared	 in	 all	 proposed	 remedies.	 The	
prescriptions	for	these	countries	also	tried	to	take	account	of	some	striking	differences,	including	
that,	in	most,	the	bulk	of	the	population	lived	on	rural	smallholdings,	producing	for	immediate	
consumption	as	well	as	often	 for	domestic	and	 international	markets.	The	question	of	how	to	
increase	agricultural	production	by	non‐waged	workers,	as	well	as	on	large	holdings	operating	
as	 forms	 of	 industrial	 capital,	 became	 a	 central	 concern	 for	 development	 prescriptions.	Most	
importantly	for	this	essay,	it	was	the	attraction	of	privatisation	and	the	subsequent	consequences	
of	privatisation	moves,	which	showed	how	accelerated	development	opened	the	door	for	grand	
corruption.		
	
An	 important	 document	 that	 presented	 the	World	 Bank’s	 prescription	 for	many	 countries	 in	
Africa	 was	 the	 1981	 Accelerated	 Development	 in	 Sub‐Saharan	 Africa:	 An	 Agenda	 for	 Action,	
commonly	referred	to	as	the	Berg	Report,	after	the	name	of	the	lead	author,	US	economist	Elliot	
Berg.	Researched	and	written	when	growth	rates	in	many	of	the	region’s	countries	had	stalled	or	
declined,	the	Berg	Report	endorsed	the	position	adopted	by	the	World	Bank’s	African	governors	
which	criticised	 the	1980	Lagos	Plan	 accepted	by	African	heads	of	 state	 for	 a	 continuation	of	
‘inward‐looking’	policies.	The	Bank’s	approved	position	would	come	to	be	known	by	 the	term	
‘economic	liberalisation’.	Subsequently	this	description	was	swallowed	under	the	omnibus	neo‐
liberalism,	a	 term	more	correctly	 reserved	 for	 the	 international	vanguardist	movement	which	
focused	initially	upon	political‐ideological	changes	in	the	USA	and	Britain	(Stedman	Jones	2014).		
	
In	the	Foreword	to	the	Berg	Report,	World	Bank	President,	AW	Clausen,	asserted	that	the	1981	
Report’s	central	proposal,	which	placed	a	greater	emphasis	upon	the	private	sector:	
	
…	is	not	a	recommendation	which	derives	from	any	preconceived	philosophy	of	
ownership.	 It	 derives	 from	 considerations	 of	 efficiency,	 which	 suggest	 that	
governments	can	more	effectively	achieve	their	social	and	development	goals	by	
reducing	the	widespread	administrative	over	commitment	of	the	public	sector	and	
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by	developing	and	relying	on	the	managerial	capacities	of	private	individuals	and	
firms,	which	can	respond	to	local	needs	and	conditions,	particularly	in	small‐scale	
industry,	marketing,	and	service	activities.	(World	Bank	1981:	v)	
	
In	other	words,	of	particular	importance	for	public	policy	was	the	apparently	technocratic	belief	
that	 private	 enterprises	 were	 invariably	more	 efficient	 than	 government	 agencies.	Wherever	
possible,	 existing	 public	 enterprises,	 including	marketing	 boards	 and	 transportation	 facilities	
(seaports,	railroads,	airports),	should	be	privatised.	The	state	marketing	agencies	were	a	special	
focus	 of	 attack,	 backed	 by	 the	 fashionable	 claim	 often	 associated	 with	 the	 work	 of	 British	
economist	Michael	Lipton	(1977),	 that	official	setting	of	domestic	agricultural	prices	shaped	a	
continuing	 bias	 in	 favour	 of	 urban	 consumers	 and	 against	 rural,	 particularly	 smallholder	
producers	of	food	crops.		
	
Despite	Clausen’s	claim	that	the	Berg	Report	did	not	stem	from	‘any	preconceived	philosophy	of	
ownership’,	 important	 underpinnings	 of	 the	 report	 were	 deeply	 ideological	 and	 without	
substantial	empirical	basis.	Thus,	the	proposals	to	increase	agricultural	output	overlooked	the	
reality	that	largeholders	and	smallholders	operated	according	to	different	rationalities,	and	that	
neither	danced	to	the	same	tune	as	set	by	national	objectives.	As	Michael	Cowen	(1986)	pointed	
out	in	the	case	of	Kenya,	the	national	government’s	need	for	internationally	generated	revenues	
through	 increased	 exports	 of	 agricultural	 crops,	 especially	 coffee,	 did	 not	 necessarily	 match	
household	need	for	income	to	maintain	or	increase	consumption.	When	coffee	prices	fell,	as	they	
had	done	from	the	late	1970s	after	the	Brazilian‐frost	induced	boom	of	1975‐1977,	households	
acted	 rationally	 in	 pulling	 out	 coffee	 bushes	 and	 planting	 maize	 for	 immediate	 and	 locally	
marketed	consumption.	But,	for	the	Kenyan	government,	such	action	was	anathema.		
	
With	 increasing	 international	 loans	 to	 service,	 threatening	 state	 revenues	 in	 this	manner	was	
tantamount	to	treason.	That	privatisation	of	the	marketing	of	cereal	food	crops	advantaged	large	
farmers	and	disadvantaged	small	producers	distant	from	railheads	and	major	collection	points	
did	nothing	to	help	the	government	politically	either.	This	effect,	 favouring	large	farmers	over	
many	small	producers,	was	particularly	detrimental	for	incoming	Kenyan	President	Daniel	arap	
Moi,	who	was	trying	to	distance	himself	politically	from	the	previous	regime	by	appealing	to	the	
‘little	fish’	and	not	the	samaki	wakubwa	(big	fish).	However,	large	farming	output	of	wheat	and	
maize	 did	 not	 increase	 either.	 During	 the	 1980s,	 Kenya	 had	 to	 commit	 foreign	 currency	
reserves—already	stretched	to	meet	 international	 loan	commitments—to	purchase	maize	and	
flour	(MacWilliam,	Desaubin	and	Timms	1995:	56).	Instead	of	the	policies	of	‘liberalisation’	and	
‘privatisation’	promoting	increased	marketing	of	produce,	households	accelerated	their	shift	into	
arenas	of	self‐sufficiency,	producing	maize	for	immediate	consumption,	as	had	begun	a	decade	
earlier	with	milk	production.	For	a	government	that	came	to	power	aiming	to	‘effect	(national:	
SM)	 self‐sufficiency	 in	 production	 and	 storage	 of	 food’	 such	 trends	were	 not	 propitious	 (Moi	
1986:	54).	
	
The	World	Bank	document’s	producers	had	provided	themselves	with	an	escape	clause	against	
such	changes	in	domestic	outcomes	by	stating	that,	given	the	diversity	of	conditions	in	individual	
countries,	 the	 Berg	 Report	 could	 not	 ‘deal	 with	 specific	 programs	 or	 problems	 of	 individual	
countries’	(World	Bank	1981:	1).	Nevertheless,	it	soon	became	obvious	that	the	economist	Berg	
was	unable	to	adequately	include	determinations	of	political	and	state	power	in	his	analysis	and	
proposals	 for	 reform.	Thus,	what	occurred	 in	Kenya	 in	 the	years	after	 the	release	of	 the	Berg	
Report	provided	a	template	for	what	was	lacking	in	the	strategy	behind	accelerated	development	
(MacWilliam	2012).	Ignoring	the	politics	of	state	power,	which	accompanied	the	previous	decade	
of	stagnation	that	reform	intended	to	fix,	the	Berg	Report	also	showed	a	simplistic	grasp	of	the	
class	politics	of	what	was	prescribed.		
	
	
Scott	MacWilliam	and	Michael	Rafferty:	From	Development	and	Grand	Corruption	to	Governance	
IJCJ&SD							18	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2017	6(4)	
Privatisation	and	corruption:	The	case	of	banking	in	Kenya	
In	1978,	President	Moi	came	to	power	in	Kenya,	a	country	still	regarded	as	one	of	the	economic	
success	stories	of	post‐colonial	Sub‐Saharan	Africa.	He	immediately	set	about	trying	to	break	the	
hold	on	state	power	of	a	Kikuyu	bourgeoisie,	which	had	been	in	control	through	a	regime	headed	
by	President	Jomo	Kenyatta.	A	layer	of	indigenous,	primarily	Kikuyu	capital,	had	displaced	the	
previous	European	dominance	of	largeholding	agriculture	and	began	to	move	into	other	areas	of	
commerce,	including	banking	and	manufacturing	(Njonjo	1977;	Swainson	1980).	As	much	as	Moi	
presented	a	populist	image,	opposed	to	corruption	and	against	the	Kikuyu	commercial	interests	
which	had	dominated	since	 Independence	 in	1964,	he	also	represented	the	drive	of	a	 further,	
second	layer	of	 indigenous	capital.	For	this	 layer,	 the	task	was	to	extend	capitalism	into	other	
arenas	as	well	as	advance	the	accumulation	of	a	KAMATUSA	(Kalenjin‐Masai‐Turkana‐Samburu)	
bloc	of	bourgeois	and	would‐be	bourgeois	(Cowen	and	MacWilliam	1996,	especially	Chapter	5).		
	
However,	in	the	circumstances	of	the	1980s,	and	the	continuing	presence	of	international,	Asian	
and	other	indigenous	capital,	the	space	for	any	new	layer	was	confined.	While	there	was	some	
room	in	largeholding	agriculture,	especially	for	tea	production,	further	extension	in	the	Rift	Valley	
and	adjoining	areas	brought	the	Kalenjin	bourgeoisie	up	against	other	largeholding	owners	and	
smallholder	demands	for	land.	One	resolution	of	this	clash	was	to	privatise	state	landholdings,	
most	 notably	 forests	 which	 included	 important	 game	 reserves	 and	 water	 catchment	 areas	
(MacWilliam	2012).	Faced	with	declining	living	standards	and	widespread	poverty,	the	regime	
turned	 increasingly	 authoritarian	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 it	 represented	 the	 activities	 of	 the	
KAMATUSA	and	politically	allied	bourgeois	(MacWilliam	2012).	As	the	national	economy	entered	
a	prolonged	downturn,	representation	of	this	new	layer	was	increasingly	portrayed	as	corruption	
on	 an	 unprecedented	 scale.	 Kenya	 became	 like	 other	 countries,	 in	 Africa	 and	 elsewhere,	
characterised	as	dominated	by	‘crony	capitalism’,	‘patrimonialism’	and	‘the	politics	of	the	belly’	
(Bayart	1993;	Robison	1986).	
	
One	commercial	arena	in	particular	came	to	be	identified	with	the	means	by	which	accumulation	
was	extended	during	Moi’s	reign.	As	Cowen	and	MacWilliam	(1996:	181‐182)	note:		
	
From	1978,	 private	 banks	multiplied	 as,	 first,	 non‐Kikuyu	 staff	were	 promoted	
within	 the	 (existing)	 parastatal	 banks	 and	 Kikuyu	 managers,	 excluded	 from	
promotion,	 set	 up	 their	 own	 banks	 and	 financial	 institutions	 …Then,	 second,	
Kalenjin‐owned	banks	were	created	…	the	‘political	banks’	were	the	latter	group	
of	Kalenjin	owned	and/or	sponsored	banks	which	were	often	managed	by	Kenya	
Asians	 and	 Kenya	 or	 expatriate	 European	managers.	 Given	 that	 the	 late‐1980s	
thrust	 of	 the	 banking	 phenomenon	 was	 to	 discriminate	 against	 Kikuyu‐owned	
banks,	it	is	the	sub‐set	of	banks	which	were	tied,	one	way	or	another,	to	the	regime	
which	are	properly	deemed	to	be	political	banks.	
	
By	the	early	1990s,	scandal	enveloped	these	political	banks	which	had	initially	received	surplus	
funds,	much	of	it	illegally	transferred	from	parastatals	including	the	National	Social	Security	Fund	
and	the	National	Hospital	Insurance	Fund.	Much	of	the	credibility	of	these	banks	‘rested	upon	the	
expectation	that	the	(Kenya)	Central	Bank	would	use	state	finance	to	bail	them	out	if	their	loanees	
defaulted’	 (Cowen	 and	MacWilliam	 1996:	 183).	 The	 political	 banks	 also	 became	 conduits	 for	
transferring	funds	overseas,	and	provided	major	funding	for	the	ruling	party,	KANU,	at	the	1992	
election.	In	short,	corruption	flourished	as	the	Moi	regime	extended	accumulation	into	the	state	
itself,	via	the	much‐applauded	privatisation	of	supposedly	inefficient	state	enterprises,	including	
banks.		
	
When	a	major	financial	scandal	erupted	in	1990‐92	(the	Goldenberg	scandal),	engulfing	some	of	
the	most	 important	members	of	Kenya’s	political	 leadership,	 the	 IMF	exerted	pressure	on	 the	
government	 to	 close	 Transnational,	 the	main	 bank	 implicated	 in	 the	 affair.	 This	 followed	 the	
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insistence	by	other	donor	agencies	that	all	political	banks	be	liquidated	(Cowen	and	MacWilliam	
1996:	182,	citing	Furuholm	and	Järsenholt	1994).	Privatisation	of	banking,	as	with	other	areas	of	
the	economy,	succeeded	or	failed	according	to	political	as	much	as	commercial	criteria.	This	puts	
into	 sharp	 relief	World	 Bank	 President	 Clausen’s	 supposedly	 non‐ideological	 claim	 about	 the	
superior	technocratic	efficiency	of	private	over	public	enterprises.	
	
Sustainable	development	and	governance	
Kenya’s	 ‘transformation’,	 if	 it	 can	 be	 called	 such,	 was	 not	 unique	 when	 compared	 to	 other	
countries	in	the	region.	By	1989,	the	World	Bank	had	published	a	‘long‐term	perspective	study’	
on	Sub‐Saharan	Africa—Sub‐Saharan	Africa:	From	Crisis	to	Sustainable	Growth—concluding	that	
the	 period	 since	 the	 appearance	 of	 the	 Berg	 Report	 was	 not	 characterised	 by	 accelerated	
development,	but	something	much	less	rosy.	This	World	Bank	report	noted	that:	
	
Africa's	deepening	crisis	is	characterized	by	weak	agricultural	growth,	a	decline	in	
industrial	output,	poor	export	performance,	climbing	debt	and	deteriorating	social	
indicators,	 institutions,	and	environment.	Agricultural	output	has	grown	by	 less	
than	1.5	percent	on	average	since	1970,	with	food	production	rising	more	slowly	
than	population.	Although	industry	grew	roughly	three	times	as	fast	as	agriculture	
in	 the	 first	 decade	 of	 independence,	 the	 past	 few	 years	 have	 seen	 an	 alarming	
reversal	in	many	African	countries	where	deindustrialization	seems	to	have	set	in.	
With	 export	 volumes	 barely	 growing	 at	 all	 since	 1970,	 Africa's	 share	 in	world	
markets	has	fallen	by	almost	half.	(World	Bank	1989:	2)	
	
Perhaps	 unsurprisingly,	World	 Bank	 President	 Barber	 Conable	 pinpointed	 the	 inadequacy	 of	
public	institutions	as	‘a	root	cause	of	weak	economic	performance’	(Conable,	in	World	Bank	1989:	
xii).	He	 then	 introduced	a	 theme,	 first	 raised	 the	year	before	 in	an	assessment	of	 ten	years	of	
structural	 adjustment	 lending	 (World	 Bank	 1988),	 which	 would	 become	 central	 to	 many	
development	programs	for	the	next	two	decades:	
	
Private	sector	initiative	and	market	mechanisms	are	important,	but	they	must	go	
hand‐in‐hand	with	good	governance—a	public	service	that	is	efficient,	a	 judicial	
system	that	is	reliable,	and	an	administration	that	is	accountable	to	its	public.	And	
a	better	balance	is	needed	between	the	government	and	the	governed.	Thus,	the	
report	sets	out	a	range	of	proposals	aimed	at	empowering	ordinary	people,	and	
especially	 women,	 to	 take	 greater	 responsibility	 for	 improving	 their	 lives—
measures	 that	 foster	 grassroots	organization,	 that	nurture	 rather	 than	obstruct	
informal	sector	enterprises,	and	that	promote	nongovernmental	and	intermediary	
organizations.	The	growing	conviction	is	that	development	must	be	more	bottom‐
up	less	top‐down	and	that	a	learning	approach	to	program	design	is	to	be	preferred	
to	the	imposition	of	blueprints.	(Conable	in	World	Bank	1989:	xii)	
	
Governance	 reform	 was	 thus	 formulated	 out	 of	 the	 earlier	 failure	 of	 measures	 proposed	 to	
‘accelerate	 development’.	 As	 Conable’s	 statement	 suggests,	 ‘the	 empowerment	 of	 ordinary	
people’,	a	political	recognition	of	those	who	did	and	did	not	hold	power	that	was	missing	from	the	
Berg	Report,	was	to	be	the	means	of	reining	in	the	‘deepening	crisis’	and	producing	‘sustainable	
growth’.	In	the	process,	the	idea	of	governance	was	itself	transformed.	
	
As	Andrew	Kerandi	has	noted,	governance	first	appeared	in	a	1988	World	Bank	Report	assessing	
ten	years	of	 structural	 adjustment	 lending.	 The	Bank	 concluded	 that	 ‘severe	 institutional	 and	
managerial	weaknesses	 in	 the	public	 and	private	 sector	have	proved	unexpectedly	 serious	 as	
constraints	to	better	performance’	(Kerandi	2008:	1,	citing	World	Bank	1988:	3).	A	year	 later,	
Sub‐Saharan	Africa:	From	Crisis	to	Sustainable	Growth	(World	Bank	1989)	began	a	policy	process	
through	which	shifts	 in	political	power	were	to	be	promoted.	In	1992,	 in	another	World	Bank	
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publication,	 governance	 was	 described	 in	 a	 form	 which	 emphasised	 its	 connection	 with	
development,	as	 ‘…	the	manner	in	which	power	is	exercised	in	the	management	of	a	country’s	
economic	 and	 social	 resources	 for	 development’	 (World	 Bank	 1992:	 1).	 As	 the	 document’s	
abstract	pronounced:	‘Good	governance	is	synonymous	with	sound	development	management’.	
	
The	idea	of	governance	subsequently	underwent	further	reformulation,	under	the	influence	of	
officials	in	other	countries	including	the	UK,	Japan	and	Australia.	As	Peter	Larmour	(1998:	1‐2)	
noted,	 by	 the	mid‐1990s	 ‘Japan’s	 International	Cooperation	Agency	 (JICA)	 began	 to	 link	 good	
governance	with	participatory	development,	democratisation	and	economic	liberalisation’.	Citing	
Australia’s	Department	of	Foreign	Affairs	and	Trade,	Larmour	provides	another	official	definition	
of	 good	 governance	 as	 ‘open,	 transparent,	 accountable,	 equitable	 and	 responsive	 to	 people’s	
needs’	(1998:	1‐2).	
	
For	 present	 purposes,	 the	 1992	 enlargement	 of	 the	 description	 contained	 an	 even	 more	
significant	 feature.	 World	 Bank	 and	 other	 official	 concern	 for	 governance	 was	 now	 moving	
beyond	its	roots	in	Sub‐Saharan	Africa’s	1980s	‘crisis	of	development’.	As	the	World	Bank’s	1992	
report,	 Governance	 and	 Development,	 noted,	 with	 the	 Bank’s	 concern	 for	 ‘equitable	 and	
sustainable	development’,	the	‘crisis	of	governance’	first	identified	in	Sub‐Saharan	Africa	was	now	
found	to	be	present	in	Eastern	Europe,	Latin	America	and	parts	of	Asia	as	well.	The	document	
indicated	that:	
	
In	 Eastern	 Europe,	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 legal	 system	 conducive	 to	 private	 sector	
development	is	a	severe	impediment	to	privatization	and	new	investment.	In	some	
Latin	 American	 countries,	 rapid	 decentralization	 has	 outstripped	 systems	 of	
accountability	 and	 civil	 service	 institutions	 at	 the	 provincial	 or	 state	 and	 local	
government	 levels,	 which	 has	 in	 turn	 increased	 already	 unsustainable	 fiscal	
deficits.	(World	Bank	1992:	4)		
	
With	 the	 dissolution	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union,	 the	 field	 for	 concern	 about	 and	 prescriptions	 for	
development	was	further	transformed.	While	countries	in	Sub‐Saharan	Africa,	Latin	America	and	
Asia	continued	to	receive	attention,	a	wave	of	prescriptions	for	bringing	development	in	Russia	
and	other	newly	independent	‘eastern	bloc’	countries	soon	appeared.	‘Shock	therapy’	was	added	
to	the	 language	of	development	 in	order	to	promote	spontaneous	accumulation	and	a	class	of	
accumulators	while	decomposing	and	transforming	the	socialist	state.	Once	more	corruption	was	
set	to	go	hand	in	glove	with	a	form	of	development.	
	
Post‐Soviet	Russia:	Capitalist	development	unplanned	
When	the	Berlin	Wall	fell	in	1989,	the	idea	that	markets	were	central	to	capitalist	development	
was	still	ascendant	internationally.	Indeed,	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union	seemed	for	a	time	to	
signal	the	historical	triumph	of	market‐based	capitalism.	This	view	of	capitalism	was	fortified	by	
the	Hayekian	notion	 that	market	 processes	 under	 capitalism	were	 spontaneous.	 So,	when	US	
government	and	international	agencies	were	asked	to	advise	post‐soviet	regimes,	the	principal	
reform	idea	was	to	bring	markets	back	to	the	planned	economies,	and	as	quickly	as	possible.	For	
instance,	following	von	Mises	notion	of	‘catallaxy’,	Hayek	suggested	that	socialism	suffered	from	
a	failure	of	socialist	economies	to	develop	an	‘extended	order’,	which	‘…	resulted	not	from	human	
design	or	intention	but	spontaneously	…’	from	market	processes	and	the	cultures	that	support	
them	(Hayek	1991:	6).	
	
Leading	 economic	 thinkers	 like	 Frederich	 Hayek,	 Milton	 Friedman,	 Ronald	 Coase	 and	 others	
(mostly	of	the	Chicago	school	but,	as	we	will	see	shortly,	notably	from	Harvard	too)	had	developed	
an	economics	extolling	the	political	and	economic	virtues	of	free	markets.	Institutional	advisers	
whose	 main	 experience	 had	 been	 in	 implementing	 policies	 based	 on	 their	 ideas	 in	 Latin	
America—notably	Argentina,	Chile	and	Bolivia—became	important	for	post‐Soviet	reforms.	 In	
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the	former,	markets	had	been	brought	to	life	by	forms	of	authoritarian	rule.	In	the	latter,	advisers	
fresh	 from	 Latin	 America	 linked	 up	 with	 leading	 politicians	 including	 Boris	 Yeltsin,	 Anatoly	
Chubais	 and	Yegor	Gaidar	 as	well	 as	 a	 handful	 of	 senior	 apparatchiks,	 to	bring	market‐based	
reforms	 (Wedel	 1998).	 And,	 instead	 of	 the	 World	 Bank—which	 had,	 via	 its	 auto‐critique	 of	
accelerated	 development	 in	 Sub‐Saharan	 Africa,	 moved	 away	 from	 market‐fundamentalism,	
particularly	after	1992—it	was	the	US	government	and	the	Harvard	Institute	for	International	
Development	(HIID),	which	assumed	principal	responsibility	for	advising	on	economic	policies.	
	
The	two	key	advisers	to	the	post‐soviet	Russian	regime	were	Harvard‐based	economists	Jeffrey	
Sachs	and	Andrei	Schleifer,	who	together	ran	the	partly	US‐government	funded	HIID.	Sachs,	who	
had	previously	worked	as	an	adviser	 to	 the	Bolivian	government	 (which,	 through	 the	 famous	
Decree	21060,	led	attacks	on	workers	under	the	banner	of	structural	adjustment),	was	an	advisor	
to	the	Yeltsin	government	in	Russia	from	1991	to	1994,	and	also	advised	Poland,	Slovenia	and	
Estonia.	
	
Sachs	famously	advocated	a	rapid	program	of	transition	in	Poland	and	Russia	on	the	basis	that,	
even	 though	 there	 would	 be	 some	 economic	 dislocation	 (and	 thus	 some	 fall	 in	 output	 and	
incomes),	the	sooner	market‐based	processes	got	working,	the	sooner	economic	growth	would	
recover.	 ‘The	 economic	 strategy	…	 argues	 for	 a	 rapid,	 straightforward	 and	 sharp	 program	 of	
economic	 reform’	 (Lipton	 and	 Sachs	 1990,	 cited	 in	 Murrell	 1993:	 113).	 The	 rapid	 transition	
strategy	became	known	as	‘shock	therapy’.	
	
Central	to	the	economic	strategy	was	a	program	of	rapid	privatisation	and	price	liberalisation.	
Jeffrey	 Sachs	 (1991:	 8)	 wrote	 that	 ‘the	 need	 to	 accelerate	 private[s]ation	 is	 the	 paramount	
economic	policy	issue	facing	Eastern	Europe’.	A	key	assumption	for	Sachs’	privatisation	program	
was	the	Coasian	view	that	markets	work	best	when	ownership	of	economic	property	is	 in	the	
hands	of	agents	with	an	incentive	to	expand	and	accumulate	capital.	Even	bad	private	owners	
were	thought	to	be	better	than	state	ownership	(see	Black,	Kraakman	and	Tarassova	2000).	The	
privatisation	project	was	 thus	 thought	 to	be	 about	 creating	 capitalist	 property	 firstly	without	
capitalists	but,	 in	so	doing,	bringing	 that	class	 to	 life.	With	ownership	 rights	 restructured	and	
market	incentives	instituted,	economic	agents	with	privatised	property	would	rationally	seek	to	
maximise	profits	from	that	property	(see,	for	instance,	Schleifer	1998).		
	
As	we	will	 show,	 there	already	was	a	class	of	accumulators	and	would‐be	capitalists	active	 in	
Russia	but	not	in	the	form	that	Sachs	and	Schleifer	understood.	Furthermore,	the	HIID	advisers,	
in	framing	the	development	project	as	one	of	building	markets	had	shown—as	had	the	authors	of	
the	Berg	Report—that	they	had	no	clear	conception	of	the	role	the	state	should	play	in	society,	
including	its	relationship	with	contradictory	class	forces.	Indeed,	as	Louise	Shelley	astutely	notes,	
the	theft	of	the	state	that	occurred	referred	not	simply	to	the	state	property	assets	handed	over	
to	oligarchs,	but	also	to	‘functions	of	the	state,	appropriated	by	corrupt	officials	for	their	personal	
gain’	(Shelly	2005:	9).	
	
Given	this	lack	of	understanding	of	class,	power	and	capital,	it	was	no	surprise	that	the	economic	
reforms,	especially	privatisation,	would	permit	state	officials	and	aspiring	capitalists	to	massively	
enrich	 themselves.	 By	 the	 mid‐1990s,	 mass	 privatisation	 on	 an	 unprecedented	 scale	 had	
occurred,	 and	 ownership	 concentration	 had	 become	 extreme.	 Despite	 the	 proposition	 that	
markets	processes	are	innate	and	that	capitalist	accumulation	tends	to	be	crowded	out	by	the	
state,	it	turns	out	that,	as	William	Tompson	observed:		
	
…	 the	 defining	 feature	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 business—particularly	 big	
business—and	 the	 state	 in	 Russia	 is	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 two	 have	 inter‐
penetrated	each	other	…	(and	as	far	as	the	oligarchs	are	concerned,	their)	fortunes	
have	always	depended	on	state	patronage	(Tompson,	cited	in	Rivera‐Werning	and	
Rivera	2006:	130).	
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Russian	privatisation	and	ownership	concentration	can	be	understood	as	occurring	in	four	main	
phases:	
	
1. The	incumbent	managers	of	many	state‐owned	enterprises,	those	who	exercised	effective	
control	over	large	amounts	of	state	resources,	effectively	looted	those	firms.	
2. The	voucher	privatisation	schemes,	which	were	quickly	subverted	by	fund	managers	who	
tunnelled	money	out	of	them	and	re‐emerged	as	the	new	owners.	
3. The	 loans	 for	 shares	 arrangement	 (LFS)	 where	 key	 state	 assets,	 especially	 natural	
resources,	 were	 granted	 to	 Yeltsin	 backers	 for	 a	 fraction	 of	 their	 value	 in	 return	 for	
electoral	funding	support.		
4. Putin	era	ownership	restructuring,	where	Putin,	his	allies	in	the	siloviki	(colleagues	in	the	
military	and	security	services),	along	with	the	St	Petersburg‐	based	bourgeois	which	he	is	
said	 to	 lead,	 gained	 control	 of	 the	 remainder	 of	 state	 property,	 as	 well	 as	 property	
confiscated	from	recalcitrant	oligarchs.	
	
The	net	result	was	that	Russia,	as	with	most	other	former	soviet	states,	went	from	one	form	of	
highly	concentrated	and	centralised	control	to	another.	While	the	idea	informing	reform	was	to	
bring	markets	to	life	and	reduce	central	planning,	there	were	already	large	markets	in	the	Soviet	
Union.	 These	 just	 were	 not	 the	 markets	 that	 late	 twentieth	 century	 US‐trained	 economists	
understood.	 Instead,	 they	were	markets	 in	 the	 so‐called	 informal	 sector,	 ‘black’	markets	 and	
organised	crime.	Private	economic	activity	in	late	Soviet	history	was	formally	illegal	and	variously	
termed	the	‘second’,	‘black’	and	‘shadow’	economy.	Indeed,	some	accounts	of	the	collapse	of	the	
Soviet	Union	argue	that	the	various	breaks	were	de	jure	recognition	of	the	de	facto	development	
of	these	markets,	and	that	the	scale	of	the	informal	and	black	markets	had	made	Soviet	central	
planning	obsolete	(Grossman	1987).	What	is	less	controversial	was	that	this	class	of	accumulators	
was	already	in	motion,	and	their	ties	to	state	power	secured,	when	the	Soviet	Union	collapsed.	
Market	reforms	aided	their	moves	to	further	enrichment	when	property	rights	were	privatised	
(Shelley	2005).	
	
Many	of	the	current	oligarchs	owe	their	fortunes	to	the	‘loans‐for‐shares’	(LFS)	auctions	held	in	
mid‐1990s,	widely	regarded	as	the	most	scandalous	episode	of	Russian	privatisation.	The	LFS	
scheme	was	designed	to	consolidate	the	bankers’	support	for	Yeltsin’s	re‐election	campaign	in	
1996.	The	rise	of	Roman	Abramovich	(in	1995‐97,	a	junior	partner	of	Boris	Berezovsky),	Mikhail	
Khodorkovsky	and,	especially,	Vladimir	Potanin	are	examples	of	the	LFS	phase	of	accumulation.	
The	other	two	major	winners	were	in	the	oil	sector,	where	insiders	Vagit	Alekperov	and	Vladimir	
Bogdanov	obtained	larger	stakes	in	firms	they	already	controlled.	However,	the	LFS	scheme	was	
only	one	means	by	which	oligarchs	managed	to	secure	access	to	state	property	(Stark	1996).	
	
However,	 there	was	a	 tranche	of	older	oligarchs	 from	 the	Soviet‐era	nomenklatura	who	were	
either	managing	the	respective	enterprises	or	working	in	government	agencies	supervising	them.	
When	the	Soviet‐era	firms	were	privatised,	they	found	ways	of	converting	their	de	facto	control	
into	ownership	rights.	By	the	mid‐1990s,	Russia	was	clearly	a	capitalist	country,	with	a	capitalist	
class,	but	more	like	late‐nineteenth	century	capitalism	in	the	United	States	of	the	‘robber	baron’	
days	than	late	twentieth	century	capitalism	in	‘Western’	countries.	
	
In	 the	Putin	era,	a	new	layer	of	oligarchs	emerged,	while	others	such	as	Berezovsky,	Vladimir	
Gusinsky,	 Yakunin,	 and	 Khodorkovsky	 had	 their	 property	 confiscated	 or	 positions	 of	 power	
revoked	 in	 a	 series	 of	 tax	 and	 corruption	 scandals.	Often	 the	property	appropriated	 from	 the	
fallen	oligarchs	and	other	privatised	state	assets	has	been	transferred	to	Putin’s	St	Petersburg‐
based	bourgeois	allies	(Bershidsky	2016;	Reznik	2016).		
	
Almost	immediately	also,	the	post‐Soviet	‘transition	to	capitalism’	became	associated	with	social	
dislocation	 and	 poverty,	 unemployment,	 homelessness,	 food	 scarcity	 and	 a	massive	 resource	
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redistribution	and	 looting,	which	was	reflected	 in,	among	other	 things,	 severe	health	 impacts.	
Death	rates	soared	and	infant	mortality	increased	rapidly.	By	1996,	the	World	Bank	was	already	
(implicitly)	announcing	the	failure	of	the	policy	of	shock	therapy.	It	cited	estimates	that,	during	
the	 1990s,	 life	 expectancy	 had	 declined	 rapidly	 and	 perhaps	 3.4	 million	 people	 had	 died	
prematurely	(Rosefielde	2005).	In	its	review	of	the	transition	record,	the	World	Bank	posed	the	
bleak	question,	‘Is	transition	a	killer?’	(World	Bank	1996:	128).	
	
The	World	Bank	report	on	transition	wrote	of	a	neglect	of	 the	damage	transition	had	done	to	
people	 in	 the	 former	 Soviet	 Union	 by	 unchecked	 processes	 of	 spontaneous	 or	 immanent	
development:	
	
Beyond	 these	 essential	 technical	 and	 institutional	 elements	 of	 transition,	 this	
Report	is	about	people.	It	is	about	how	people	can	be	protected	from	the	loss	of	
security	 and	 income	 that	 can	accompany	 transition,	how	 they	 can	be	helped	 to	
cope	with	the	 increased	mobility	and	know‐how	required	of	workers	 in	market	
economies,	and	how	their	children	must	receive	the	education	and	health	care	that	
will	allow	them	to	contribute	to	the	prosperity	to	which	their	countries	aspire	….	
(World	Bank	1996:	iii)	
	
The	World	Bank’s	ten‐year	review	of	transition	(2002)	later	extended	its	implicit	critique	of	shock	
therapy,	noting	that	there	had	been	a	five‐fold	increase	in	poverty	in	post‐soviet	Russia.	In	1998	
one	 in	 five	people	 in	 the	country	survived	on	 less	 than	US$2.15	a	day,	a	 standard	measure	of	
absolute	poverty.	A	decade	before	fewer	than	one	in	25	lived	in	such	absolute	poverty.	The	World	
Bank	also	concluded	that,	‘Ownership	concentration	has	been	associated	with	diminished	state	
capacity	to	provide	public	goods	needed	for	the	market	economy	as	a	result	of	corruption,	and	
weak	public	sector	management’	(2002:	5).	
	
Even	more	explicitly,	the	World	Bank’s	ten‐year	review	of	transition	made	a	direct	challenge	to	
shock	therapy	and	its	denial	of	political	power.	It	concluded,	for	instance:	
	
Political	 developments	 and	economic	 reforms	 are	 closely	 interrelated	 ...	 reform	
choices	 shape	 the	 configuration	 of	 social	 groups	 and	 the	distribution	 of	 power,	
which	affects	the	structure	and	functioning	of	the	political	system	…	As	a	result,	a	
stronger	case	can	be	made	for	identifying	the	direction	of	[successful]	causation	
from	political	choices	to	economic	choices.	(World	Bank	2002:	22)	
	
But	while	the	hegemonic	development	policy	view	is	now	that	Russia	is	a	corrupt	state	that	is	
preventing	development,	there	is	a	contending	view	that	Russia	is	still	going	through	a	phase	of	
development.	 Former	 Harvard	 Institute	 for	 International	 Development	 economist	 Andrei	
Schleifer,	 and	his	colleague	Daniel	Treisman,	argue	 that	Russia	 is	now	 just	a	normal	capitalist	
country.	They	suggest:	
	
Countries	in	this	income	range	have	democracies	that	are	rough	around	the	edges,	
if	they	are	democratic	at	all.	Their	governments	suffer	from	corruption,	and	their	
press	is	almost	never	entirely	free.	Most	have	high	income	inequality,	concentrated	
corporate	 ownership	 and	 turbulent	 macroeconomic	 performance.	 In	 all	 these	
regards,	Russia	is	quite	normal.	(Schleifer	and	Treisman	2005:	152)	
	
Conclusion:	Corruption,	governance,	intentionality	and	capitalist	development	
This	article	used	Cowen	and	Shenton’s	observation	about	the	policy	division	on	development	and	
corruption	to	explore	two	cases	of	development:	1980s	Kenya	under	the	influence	of	the	World	
Bank’s	policy	of	Accelerated	Development;	and	1990s	post‐Soviet	Russia	under	the	policies	of	
shock	 therapy	 and	 spontaneous	 development.	 The	 article	 showed	 how,	 in	 the	 two	 cases	 of	
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unfettered	capitalist	development,	the	destructive	consequences	were	such	as	to	institute	forms	
of	accumulation	that	are	now	characterised	variously	as	corrupt,	oligarchical,	authoritarian	and	
kleptocratic.	These	 forms	of	 development	are	also	 seen	as	denuding	 the	 state	of	 capacities	 to	
ameliorate	the	destructive	effects	of	accumulation.		
	
The	destructive	and	enduring	effects	of	these	forms	of	development	have	been	such	as	to	provoke	
a	redefinition	of	the	policy	of	development	under	the	guise	of	governance	and	sustainability,	to	
attempt	to	make	productive	that	which	actual	development	has	damaged	or	displaced.	Central	to	
the	new	policy	of	development	is	the	renewed	view	that	unfettered	development	produces	forms	
of	disorder,	destruction	and	corruption.	This	has	involved	not	just	a	change	in	the	understanding	
of	the	dark	side	of	market	processes,	but	also	much	greater	attention	to	the	importance	of	the	
state,	 political	 power,	 legitimacy	 and	 social	 organisation	 (Ostry,	 Loungani	 and	 Furceri	 2016;	
World	Bank	 2017).	 As	World	Bank	President	 Paul	Wolfowitz	 observed	 about	 anti‐corruption	
initiatives	in	2006,	now	at	the	centre	of	international	state	practices	and	policies	to	ameliorate	
forms	of	capitalist	development	and	bring	development:	
	
In	the	last	half‐century	we	have	developed	a	better	understanding	of	what	helps	
governments	 function	 effectively	 and	 achieve	 economic	 progress.	 In	 the	
development	 community,	 we	 have	 a	 phrase	 for	 it.	We	 call	 it	 good	 governance.	
(Wolfowitz,	cited	in	World	Bank	2007:	1)	
	
Under	the	expanding	rubric	of	governance,	a	notion	of	the	developmental	state	(though	perhaps	
not	the	often‐corrupt	nation	state)	is	re‐emerging,	but	so	too	is	the	focus	on	social	and	political	
organisation.	As	a	World	Bank	report	put	it,	one	of	the	lessons	for	strengthened	governance	and	
anti‐corruption	 is	 the	 necessity	 of	 ‘…	 capacity	 in	 government	 and	 institutions	 outside	 central	
government,	such	as	parliament,	civil	society,	media	and	local	communities,	as	well	as	an	enabling	
environment	in	which	these	stakeholders	can	operate’	(2007:	iv).	
	
Nobel	 Laureate	 institutional	 economist	 Douglas	 North	 recently	 gave	 this	 re‐evaluation	 of	
development	an	explicitly	political	economic	 twist,	and	reminded	us	of	 its	nineteenth	century	
links.	In	pushing	away	from	economistic	conceptions	of	development	as	a	spontaneous	market	
process,	he	has	rediscovered	what	Cowen	and	Shenton	characterise	as	intentional	development.	
North	now	claims	that:	
	
The	key	 to	understanding	 the	process	of	 change	 is	 the	 intentionality	 [emphasis	
added]	of	the	players	enacting	institutional	change	and	their	comprehension	of	the	
issues	…	In	the	Western	world	…	we	tend	to	take	order	for	granted.	We	should	not.	
Disorder—revolution,	lack	of	personal	security,	chaos—has	characterized	a	great	
deal	of	the	human	condition	…	Understanding	the	underlying	conditions	of	order	
and	disorder	is	essential	for	coming	to	grips	with	the	process	of	economic	change.	
(North	2005:	3)		
	
North	is	saying	here	that	corruption	is	one	marker	of	non‐development	(or,	as	the	World	Bank	
puts	 it,	 one	outcome	of	poor	governance).	He	 is	also	 suggesting	 that	 it	 is	possible	and	 indeed	
desirable	to	intentionally	govern	to	avoid	or	minimise	disorder	that	inevitably	comes	from	forms	
of	spontaneous	development.		
	
More	 recently	 still,	 Francis	 Fukuyama	has	 revisited	 (and	 recanted	much	 of)	 his	 earlier	 thesis	
about	 the	 inevitability	 of	 progress	 and	 democracy	 under	 capitalism.	 In	 the	 face	 of	 mounting	
evidence	 of	 illiberal	 and	 oligarchical	 nations	 in	 the	 Middle	 East,	 Africa	 and	 Eastern	 Europe,	
Fukuyama	(2006,	2014)	has	recognised	the	fragility	of	democracy	and	democratic	institutions.	
After	 breaking	 with	 the	 neoconservatives	 in	 Washington,	 following	 unsuccessful	 military	
incursions	in	the	Middle	East,	Fukuyama	has	shifted	from	urging	US	foreign	policy‐makers	of	the	
need	 to	 target	 anti‐democratic	 governments	 (regime	 change),	 onto	 highlighting	 the	 need	 to	
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actively	 promote	 democracy.	 In	 engaging	 with	 the	 shift	 of	 development	 policy	 toward	
governance,	 he	 has	 also	 been	 arguing	 for	 a	 changing	 focus	 from	 checking	 state	 power	 to	
developing	state	and	civil	society	capacities.		
	
While	good	governance	and	democracy	tend	to	be	twinned	in	development	policy,	Fukuyama	has,	
more	recently	still,	even	suggested	that	the	state	can	assert	trusteeship	(or,	 in	his	terms,	good	
governance)	 through	 greater	 administrative	 capacity	 and	 autonomy	 from	 political	 forces	
(Fukuyama	 2013).	 Indeed,	 he	 is	 now	 suggesting	 a	 provisional	 definition	 of	 governance	 as	 ‘a	
government’s	ability	to	make	and	enforce	rules	and	deliver	services,	regardless	of	whether	the	
government	is	democratic	or	not’	(Fukuyama	2013:	3).	He	motivates	this	rather	instrumental	and	
democratically	agnostic	view	of	governance	on	the	basis	that	that	he,	following	Michael	Mann,	is	
now	more	interested	in	 ‘infrastructural’	rather	than	‘despotic’	power.	In	articulating	this	view,	
Fukuyama	 leans	 toward	 a	 trusteeship	 concept	 of	 state	 power,	 which	 emphasises	 the	 role	 of	
development	in	producing	social	order.	According	to	Fukuyama’s	new	approach	to	political	and	
social	order,	‘[w]hat	really	distinguishes	political	systems	from	one	another	is	the	degree	to	which	
the	elites	ruling	them	seek	to	use	their	power	in	the	service	of	a	broad	public	interest	or	simply	
to	enrich	themselves,	their	friends	and	their	families’	(Fukuyama	2016:	1).	
	
Finally,	 Jeffrey	 Sachs	 (2017),	 who	moved	 on	 rapidly	 from	 Eastern	 Europe,	 notably	 playing	 a	
leading	role	in	the	development	of	the	UN’s	Millennium	Development	Goals,	has	also	expressed	
growing	 scepticism	 about	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 benefits	 of	 unfettered	 global	 capitalism.	
Sachs	 too	 has	 followed	 the	 move	 in	 development	 policy	 toward	 state	 capacity	 building	 and	
collective	 government	 action.	 But,	 given	 the	 problems	 with	 turning	 plans	 for	 intentional	
development	such	as	the	Millennium	Development	Goals	into	action,	he	is	now	interested	in	how	
to	make	 development	 happen,	 extending	 his	 interest	 to	 political	 and	 civil	 society.	 Similar	 to	
Fukuyama,	 Sachs	 now	 regrets	 the	 loss	 of	 political	 power	 of	 middle	 and	 working	 classes.	
Commenting	specifically	on	the	demise	of	the	political	and	organisational	power	of	labour	Sachs	
now	laments:		
	
The	 parties	 I	 most	 admire	 are	 the	 social‐democratic	 parties,	 and	 they’re	
disappearing	 in	 most	 places,	 because	 their	 sociological	 base,	 which	 was	 trade	
unionism,	 has	 disappeared.	 We	 really	 need	 to	 reconstitute	 politics	 on	 a	 new	
sociological	base	that	makes	sense,	given	how	people	live,	what	young	people	do,	
how	they	earn	their	incomes,	and	so	forth.	So	politics	needs	to	be	remade,	I	believe,	
through	mass	participation.	(Sachs	2017:	7)	
	
North,	Fukuyama	and	Sachs	thus	bring	us	to	the	historical	origins	of	our	current	thinking	about	
capitalism,	development	and	corruption.	After	two	decades	in	which	progress	has	been	linked	to	
re‐imposing	the	external	authority	of	capital	under	the	banners	of	accelerated	and	spontaneous	
development,	 responding	to	the	negative	consequences	(including	much	of	what	 is	now	being	
called	corruption)	of	this	form	of	development	is	seeing	efforts	to	ameliorate	those	effects.	In	so	
doing,	the	intentionality	of	development	and	the	agency	of	development	are	again	being	brought	
to	the	fore.	Whether	it	is	under	the	banner	of	governance,	sustainability	or	North’s	intentionality,	
the	 contradictory	 poles	 of	 capitalist	 development	 are	 now	 the	 subject	 of	 active	 policy	 and	
academic	debate.	And	these	debates	echo	and	rhyme	with	earlier	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	
century	 debates	 about	 progress	 and	 development	 under	 capitalism.	 As	 Cowen	 and	 Shenton	
speculated	 in	 the	 mid‐1990s	 when	 contemplating	 how	 intentional	 development	 might	 be	
reformulated	 in	 the	 face	 of	 non‐development,	 labelled	now	variously	 as	 failed	 states,	 illiberal	
capitalism	or	grand	corruption:	
	
The	 main	 vehicle	 will	 be	 an	 amalgam	 of	 official	 and	 non‐governmental	 aid	
organizations	whose	task,	in	assuming	the	mantle	of	development,	is	to	confront	
the	 destruction	 wrought	 by	 progress.	 In	 the	 face	 of	 a	 corrupt	 leadership,	
trusteeship	(though	none	dare	speak	 its	name)	will	have	to	be	exercised	by	the	
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knowing	and	the	moral	on	behalf	of	the	ignorant	and	corrupt.	(Cowen	and	Shenton	
1995:	57)	
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